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I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri adheres to the common law doctrine of interspousal tort im-
munity, which precludes spouses from suing one another in personal tort
during coverture.1 As a result, Missouri spouses have no tort remedy
available when their spouses commit personal torts against them during
marriage.
Interspousal tort immunity arose out of the legal nature of the husband-
wife relationship at common law. At marriage, the wife's identity merged
into that of her husband, and her legal existence was suspended for the dura-
tion of the marriage. 2 The wife had no independent rights; she could not
contract, convey property, or sue or be sued in her own name unless her
husband was joined as a plaintiff or defendant.3 As a result, no cause of ac-
tion arose at common law when an interspousal tort was committed during
marriage because the rights and duties a husband and wife owed to one
another were united in the same person. 4 Suing one's spouse also produced
1. Coverture describes the state of a married woman at common law whereby
the civil existence of the wife was for many purposes incorporated into that of her
husband during marriage. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Mo. En
Banc 1959).
2. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.10, at 643 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
859-61 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L.
REV. 303, 303-05 (1959); Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-
Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 152-53 (1961). For a com-
prehensive study of the rights of the spouses during marriage at common law, see
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930).
3. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 859-61.
4. McCurdy, 43 HARV. L. REV., supra note 2, at 1033.
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the procedural impossibility of having the husband on both sides of the
lawsuit.
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, almost every state enacted
Married Women's Property Acts, which purported to grant married women
a separate legal identity.6 The statutes gave married women separate owner-
ship and control of their own property and authorized them to sue and be
sued as if they were unmarried.7 The Married Women's Acts typically did
not specify, however, whether a wife could sue her husband for personal tort. 8
Consequently, the impact of these statutes on interspousal tort immunity
was uneven. Approximately sixteen states construed their acts as abrogating
interspousal tort immunity.9 Other states, including Missouri in Rogers v.
Rogers,' 0 intetlpreted the Married Women's Acts as procedural and not as
creating any new substantive rights. " These jurisdictions argued that the
statutes were intended to remove the common law limitation that the hus-
band be joined in order for the wife to maintain a cause of action and not
to authorize interspousal tort actions.' 2 Because the Married Women's Acts
generally were silent regarding interspousal liability, courts in these jurisdic-
tions refused to construe the acts as abrogating interspousal immunity as
to personal torts. 3 Thus, in the states where the Married Women's Acts
5. Id. The unity doctrine applied only to the civil nature of the spouses.
Criminal law regarded them as separate individuals. W. PROSSER, supra note 2,
at 859.
6. McCurdy, 4 VILL. L. REV., supra note 2, at 308 n.40; Moore, The Case
for Retention of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 943, 943 (1980); An-
not., 92 A.L.R.3d 901, 905 (1979).
7. Authorities cited note 6 supra.
8. See Comment, supra note 2, at 153-54. See also Annot., supra note 6, at
907-08.
9. See Annot., supra note 6, at 927-32; id. (Supp. 1981), at 10. The wording
of the statutes varied from state to state. Some statutes expressly permitted or pro-
hibited interspousal personal injury suits. McCurdy, 4 VILL. L. REV., supra note
2, at 312, 319-22.
10. 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915).
11. See Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 206, 177 S.W. 382, 383 (1915); An-
not., supra note 6, at 912-17; id. (Supp. 1981), at 10. See also Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (Court upheld lower court's holding that District of Col-
umbia statute authorizing women "to sue separately for the recovery, security, or
protection of their property, and for torts committed against them, as fully and freely
as if they were unmarried" did not so modify common law as to allow wife to sue
husband for assault and battery). The Thompson Court stated, "The statute was
not intended to give a right of action as against the husband, but to allow the wife,
in her own name, to maintain actions of tort which at common law must be brought
in the joint names of herself and husband." Id. at 617.
12. See Annot., supra note 6, at 927-32; id. (Supp. 1981), at 10.
13. Authorities cited note 12 supra.
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were construed as procedural, a wife could sue anyone in law or equity ex-
cept her husband for a personal tort.
14
Although interspousal tort immunity is still recognized in a few states,
it is a dying doctrine. Twenty-nine states have abrogated the doctrine, and
eight others have modified it. 15 These states have summarily rejected the
14. The wife was able to sue her husband in contraci or for a property tort
in these jurisdictions because of the specific statutory language. See note 89 and ac-
companying text infra. Thus, the unity fiction was abrogated, except for personal
torts.
15. For cases and statutes abrogating interspousal tort immunity, see Penton
v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1931); Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77
So. 335 (1917); Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Leach v. Leach,
227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70,
26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr.
97 (1962); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Bushnell v. Bushnell,
103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572d (West Cum. Supp. 1981); Rogers v.
Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974); Brooks v. Robinson, 259
Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979);
Combs v. Combs, 262 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1953); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480
(Ky. 1953); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A. 2d 71 (Me. 1980); Brown v. Brown,
- Mass. -, 409 N.E.2d 717 (1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351
N.E.2d 526 (1976); Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971);
Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Imigv. March, 203
Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193
A.2d 439 (1963); Merenoffv. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978); Im-
mer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M.
213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct. App.
1973); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §3-313 (McKinney 1978); Roberts v. Roberts, 185
N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W.
526 (1932); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Fiedler v.
Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 140 P. 1022 (1914); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d
859 (1981); Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932); Scotvold v. Scot-
vold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d
637 (1973); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972); Coffindaffer
v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E. 2d 338 (W. Va. 1978); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209
N.W. 475 (1926).
For cases modifying interspousal tort immunity, see Windauer v. O'Connor,
107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971) (after divorce, spouse may sue for intentional
tort committed during coverture); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77
(1978) (wife allowed to sue for intentional tort committed during marriage); Rupert
v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974) (interspousal immunity abolished
regarding claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or.
242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955) (wife allowed to sue husband for intentional tort com-
mitted during marriage); Digby v. Digby, - R.I. -, 388 A.2d 1 (1978) (im-
munity abolished as to claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents); Bounds v.
Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977) (interspousal immunity abolished with regard
19821
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unity of husband and wife fiction 16 and have weighed public policy in favor
of partial or total abrogation of interspousal immunity. 7 Several states that
have retained interspousal tort immunity have abandoned the unity fiction
as the doctrine's basis in favor of public policy considerations, such as the
preservation of domestic tranquility and the prevention of collusive claims.' 8
The judicial history of the doctrine in Missouri has been the reverse of
the national trend. Despite the departure from interspousal tort immunity
in the United States and the even more pronounced trend away from the
common law unity fiction, Missouri courts have relied primarily on the unity'
notion in upholding interspousal immunity. 19 This reliance has been un-
predictable, however, as the Missouri Supreme Court has oscillated between
substantive and procedural interpretations of the unity bar to suit. 20 The
supreme court also has been influenced by the silence of the Missouri
legislature concerning interspousal immunity. 21 Because an understanding
of the current state of interspousal tort immunity requires a knowledge of
its history, this comment will first examine the judicial history of the doc-
trine in Missouri. It then will evaluate the factors which have been case-
dispositive to the Missouri Supreme Court.
II. JUDICIAL HISTORY OF INTERSPOUSAL TORT
IMMUNITY IN MISSOURI
The Missouri Supreme Court first pronounced the existence of in-
terspousal tort immunity in Rogers v. Rogers,22 decided in 1915. In Rogers,
the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of a wife's false imprisonment ac-
tion against her husband. The husband had committed his wife to an in-
sane asylum for several months while they were married. The court's holding
was based on its construction of the Missouri Married Women's Act.23 The
to willful and intentional torts); Stoker v. Stoker, 6"16 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980) (court
refused to apply immunity to intentional infliction of injuries by husband on wife
before divorce); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971) (im-
munity abolished as to motor vehicle accidents).
16. See note 86 and accompanying text infra.
17. See Part IV. infra.
18. See, e.g., Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161 (Del. 1979); Raisen v. Raisen,
379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979); Robeson v. International Indem. Co., 248 Ga. 306,
282 S.E.2d 896 (1981); Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 631 P.2d 646 (1981); Lyons
v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
19. See Part III.A. infra.
20. See Part II. infra.
21. See Part 111.0. infra.
22. 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915).
23. 265 Mo. at 206-08, 177 S.W. at 383-84. The Missouri Married Women's
Act allowed a wife to sue and transact business in her own name, independently
of her husband. At the same time, the wife became accountable for her own liabilities
and obligations. See Comment, supra note 2, at 154. The first such statute in Missouri
appeared at Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 128, § 7 (1855), and provided in part, "When a
522 [Vol. 47
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court noted that at common law a husband could not sue his wife for a per-
sonal tort and ruled that in the absence of an express statute, the wife's right
to sue her husband for a personal tort should be no greater. 24 The court held
that whether construed as a substantive declaration of rights or as a rule of
procedure, the Married Women's Act granted neither express nor implied
authority to a wife to sue her husband for a personal torL
2 5
The effect of the Rogers decision was to retain the common law unity fic-
tion for personal torts despite the broad, general language of the Missouri
Married Women's Act.2 6 Rogers is pivotal in the Missouri case law not only
married woman is a party, her husband must be joined with her, except that: First,
When the action concerns her separate property, she may sue and be sued alone;
Second, When an action is between herself and her husband, she may sue and be
sued alone." The statute was amended in id. ch. 59, § 3468 (1879), to read, "When
a married woman is a party, her husband must be joined with her in all actions
except those in which the husband is the sole plaintiff and the wife the sole defen-
dant, or the wife a plaintiff and the husband a defendant ......
By the time Rogers was decided, however, the express language about a wife suing
her husband had been removed. The statute was amended in id. ch. 33, § 1996
(1889), to read, "A married woman may, in her own name, with or without join-
ing her husband as a party, sue and be sued... with the same force and effect as
if she was afemme sole ... ." This was the language of id. ch. 21, § 1735 (1909),
construed in Rogers.
Two other statutes comprised the remainder of the Missouri Married Women's
Act. Id. ch. 77, § 8304 (1909), was also construed in Rogers. The statute, first enacted
in id. ch. 109, § 6864 (1889), authorized married women to transact business, con-
tract and sue on their own account, and declared that a wife may invoke the pro-
tection of the homestead and exemption laws equally with her husband when he
has not exercised the right. The third section of the Missouri Married Women's
Act, id. ch. 77, 5 8309 (1909), is discussed in note 29 infra. This section dealt with
the separate property rights of a married woman and was not considered by the
court in Rogers. For a discussion of the current derivative sections of the Missouri
Married Women's Act, see note 39 infra.
24. 265 Mo. at 206-07, 177 S.W. at 384. The court stated, "These sections
do not attempt to confer greater rights of action upon a married woman than are
possessed by her husband ... ." Id.
25. Id. The court added that the wisdom orjustice of such a statute was wholly
within the purview of the legislature. Id. at 208, 177 S.W. at 384.
26. See note 23 supra. For other constructions of the Missouri Married
Women's Act, see Faris v. Hope, 298 F. 727 (8th Cir. 1924) (wife may not sue hus-
band for libel while married, citingRogers); Exparte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W.
936 (1920) (wife may sue husband for maintenance and child custody); Planck v.
Planck, 199 S.W. 1183 (Mo. 1917) (mem.) (decision following Rogers; court dismiss-
ed wife's suit against husband for conspiring to incarcerate her in insane asylum);
Regal Realty & Inv. Co. v. Gallagher, 188 S.W. 151 (Mo. 1916) (wife may sue
husband in contract); Grimes v. Reynolds, 184 Mo. 679, 83 S.W. 1132 (1904) (right
of wife to litigate concerning her separate estate, to become creditor or debtor of
her husband, and authority of either spouse to enforce their rights in equity against
other declared); Rice, Stix & Co. v. Sally, 176 Mo. 107, 75 S.W. 398 (1903) (wife
1982]
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because it was the firstjudicial pronouncement of interspousal tort immunity
in Missouri, but also because the statutes construed in Rogers were identical
to or predecessors of statutes construed in subsequent Missouri Supreme
Court decisions, and as a result, the Rogers construction has been followed
consistently. 27
The court was asked to overrule Rogers in Willott v. Willotl,2 8 when a wife
sued her husband for injuries sustained when he wrested the steering wheel
from her and caused their automobile to turn over in a ditch. The court held
that the wife could not sue her husband, citing the Rogers reasoning that the
Married Women's Act did not expressly change the common law by giv-
ing a wife the right to sue her husband for a personal tort. 29 Willott differed
from Rogers, however, by treating the bar as substantive: no cause of action
arose for an interspousal personal tort.3 0 Rogers, on the other hand, treated
the unity bar as procedural: a cause of action may have arisen, but a hus-
band and wife were legally disabled from suing each other in tort while
married .31
The first judicial departure from strict application of the interspousal
tort immunity doctrine occurred in Mullally v. Langenberg Brothers Grain Co. ,32
in which the Missouri Supreme Court held that a wife could sue her hus-
band's employer for personal injuries sustained as a result of her husband's
negligence while acting in the course of his employment. 33 The court
could maintain action at law against husband in contract or in property tort); Reed
v. Painter, 145 Mo. 341, 46 S.W. 1089 (1898) (wife may sue husband in equity
during coverture to recover title to her property that he wrongfully took in his name);
Butterfield v. Butterfield, 195 Mo. App. 37, 187 S.W. 295 (K.C. 1916) (wife may
sue husband's joint tortfeasor, but may not sue husband); Shewalter v. Wood, 183
S.W. 1127 (Mo. App., K.C. 1916) (either spouse may sue other in replevin or con-
version, or for willful and malicious destruction of spouse's separate property).
27. See, e.g., Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo. En Banc 1972);
Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Mo. En Banc 1959); Willott v. Willott,
333 Mo. 896, 898, 62 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (1933).
28, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084 (1933).
29. Id. at 898-99, 62 S.W.2d at 1085. The court construed the same two sec-
tions of the Missouri Married Women's Act as in Rogers. Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 5,
§ 704 (1929) & id. ch. 20, § 2998 were identical to id. ch. 21, § 1735 (1909) & id.
ch. 77, § 8304, respectively, construed in Rogers. In Willott, the court said that a
third section of the Missouri Married Women's Act, id. ch. 20, § 3003 (1929), was
inapplicable to the issue at bar because it related solely to the separate property rights
of a married woman. Ironically, the historical comments that accompanied the
statute stated that since the statute had some of the same provisions as id. § 2998,
the two sections were to be construed together. Nevertheless, the Willott court said
that id. § 3003 was not applicable, even though the court did construe id. § 2998.
30, 333 Mo. at 898, 62 S.W.2d at 1085.
31. Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 205, 177 S.W. 382, 383 (1915).
32. 339 Mo. 582, 98 S.W.2d 645 (1936).
33. One month after Mullaly, the Kansas City Court of Appeals reached the
same conclusion in Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 231 Mo. App. 276, 96 S.W.2d 1082
(K.C. 1936), relying on the comments to RESTATEMENTOFAGENCY § 217 (1933).
[Vol. 47
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recognized that jurisdictions were split on the issue and that some states had
denied the employer's liability on the basis of interspousal tort immunity.
Nevertheless, the court chose not to apply the doctrine.3 4 In Mullally, the
employer argued that interspousal tort immunity precluded the wife's
respondeat superior suit. The court maintained that the employer's argu-
ment implied that the husband's act, however negligent, was nonetheless
lawful because committed by the plaintiff's husband. The court stated that
this argument perverted the meaning and effect of the interspousal disability
because others may not hide behind the skirts of the husband's immunity. 35
Anticipating the argument that its decision would have the same practical
effect as allowing the wife to sue her husband directly because the employer
could sue the husband for indemnification, the court noted that the employer
who recovers from his employee does so on the basis of a breach of duty owed
to the employer and not on a theory of subrogation to the tort victim's cause
of action. 36
The interspousal tort immunity issue did not come before the Missouri
Supreme Court again until the late 1950s, when the court made two signifi-
cant modifications of the doctrine. In Hamilton v. Fulkerson,37 the court held
that a wife was entitled to sue her husband for an antenuptial personal tort
when she sustained injuries before she was married due to her future hus-
band's negligent operation of an automobile in which she was a passenger.3 1
The court's holding was based on its interpretation of Missouri Revised
Statutes section 451.250 3 9 which provided that any personal property, in-
34. The court relied extensively on judge Cardozo's opinion in Schubert v.
Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928), in which the New York
court allowed the wife to sue her husband's employer.
35. 339 Mo. at 586, 98 S.W.2d at 646.
36. Id. at 586-87, 98 S.W.2d at 646.
37. 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1956).
38. The lawsuit in Hamilton was instituted two days before the marriage. Id.
at 643. In Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959), the Missouri Supreme
Court extended its holding in Hamilton by ruling that a wife could sue her husband
for an antenuptial tort, even though the suit was not instituted until after they were
married. Relying on Hamilton, the court said it was immaterial that the suit was
not instituted prior to the marriage. Id. at 791.
39. (1949). At the time Hamilton was decided, the sections of the Missouri Mar-
ried Women's Act had been amended again. Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 21, 51735 (1909),
construed in Rogers, and id. ch. 5, § 704 (1929), construed in Willott, were repealed
in 1943. See 1943 Mo. Laws 353, § 11 (codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 507.010(1949)). Mo. REV. STAT. § 507.010 (1949) provided for the prosecution of actions
in the name of the real party in interest. This new statute no longer made reference
to married women. As a result the Hamilton court stated that it need not further
concern itself with the Rogers and Willott construction of this section. 285 S.W.2d
at 643.
The other section of the Married Women's Act construed in Rogers and Willott,
Mo. REv. STAT. ch. 77, 5 8304 (1909), and id. ch. 20, § 2998 (1929), respectively,
was without pertinent change. See id. § 451.290 (1949).
Id. § 451.250 was the 1949 equivalent of id. ch. 20, § 3003 (1929), which the
1982]
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cluding rights in action belonging to a woman when she married, remain-
ed her separate property and under her sole control. The statute authorized
her to recover any such personal property, including rights in action, as if
she were unmarried. 40 The court remarked that section 451.250 seemed to
authorize a wife to sue her husband for an antenuptial personal tort.41 The
statute was designed to remove the common law limitation that the husband
became possessed of the wife's property, including choses in action, on
marriage. 42 Because the statute did not expressly grant a married woman
the right to sue her husband for an antenuptial personal tort, however, the
court was faced with the same argument presented in Rogers and Willott-
that one spouse should not be given greater rights than the other possessed
at common law and that as a result of the unity fiction at common law the
antenuptial claims of both the husband and the wife were extinguished at
marriage. 43 The court rejected the unity fiction, stating that no logical reason
existed for maintaining the common law rule extinguishing all antenuptial
claims between spouses.4 4 The court also found no public policy considera-
tions that warranted extending the Rogers holding to include antenuptial per-
sonal torts.45 The court cautioned that its decision was limited to the specific
facts of the case and did not contemplate whether Rogers and Willott should
be overruled. 46
Less than a year later in Ennis v. Truhitte,47 the court held that a wife
could sue the administrator of her deceased husband's estate for the negligent
acts of her husband during coverture. Relying on Hamilton, the court adopted
the rationale that a tort arises at the time of injury and ruled that an in-
terspousal tort cause of action survives the marriage. 48 The court reasoned
that the unity fiction should not bar the wife's suit because the husband was
dead and there was no longer a marital relation to disturb. 49 The court
Willott court said did not apply when a personal tort was committed during cover-
ture, see note 29 supra. In Hamilton, however, since the case involved an antenup-
tial tort, the court found MO. REV. STAT. § 451.250 (1949) to be pertinent. 285
S.W.2d at 644.
40. Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.250 (1949).
41. 285 S.W.2d at 645.
42. See Comment, supra note 2, at 152.
43. 285 S.W.2d at 645.
44. Id. See note 92 and accompanying text infra.
45. 285 S.W.2d at 647. Seenotes 162 & 163 and accompanying text infra (public
policy arguments made by court against extending interspousal tort immunity to
preclude antenuptial tort suits).
46. 285 S.W.2d at 647.
47. 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. En Banc 1957) (overruled in Ebel v. Ferguson, 478
S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (plurality opinion)). In Ennis, the wife sued
her husband's administrator for injuries sustained as a result of her husband's
reckless driving. The husband was killed. 306 S.W.2d at 550.
48. 306 S.W.2d at 551.
49. Id. at 550. The majority reasoned that by permitting recovery for a tort
[Vol. 47
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distinguished Rogers and Willott on the ground that those actions were in-
stituted directly against the husbands during the marriages.5 0
The judicial trend away from strict application of interspousal tort im-
munity suffered a setback in the next immunity case before the Missouri
Supreme Court. In Brawner v. Brawner,51 a husband sued his wife for per-
sonal injuries sustained when he was struck by the car his wife had negligently
parked on their driveway. The court was faced for the first time with the
issue of whether a wife had the legal capacity to be sued by her husband in
a negligence action.5 2 The court remarked that the husband's lawsuit was
authorized by Missouri Revised Statutes section 537.040,53 without resort-
ing to the derivative sections of the Married Women's Act. 54 Section 537.040
provided that "[flor all civil injuries committed by a married woman,
damages may be recovered against her alone, and her husband shall not be
responsible therefore.' 5 Nevertheless, the court held that the husband could
not maintain the suit.5 6 The court noted that interspousal tort immunity was
inflicted before marriage, Hamilton bit further into the common law rule of in-
terspousal tort immunity and its basic theory than did Ennis, where there was no
longer a marital relation to disturb. Id. The dissenter agreed that it belied reality
to argue that there was no tort when a husband negligently or intentionally injures
his wife, but argued that the immunity was based on a sound public policy. The
dissenter warned that once the disability was removed the courts would be flooded
with litigation. With such far-reaching implications, the dissenter maintained that
the legislature was the proper body to make such a change and not the court. Id.
at 552 (Eager, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 551.
51. 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
52. Id. at 810. In Rice v. Gray, 225 Mo. App. 890, 34 S.W.2d 567 (K.C.
1930), the court held that a husband could not sue his wife for an intentional tort.
In Rice, the husband sued his wife for conspiring to incarcerate him in an insane
asylum under false pretenses. The case as to the wife was dismissed because she
was the plaintiff's wife. Id. at 901, 34 S.W.2d at 573 (citing Rogers). The husband's
capacity to sue his wife was a peripheral issue in the case. Brawner was the first
Missouri case to consider whether a husband could sue his wife for a negligent per-
sonal tort.
53. (1949).
54. 327 S.W.2d at 811. The derivative sections of the Married Women's Act
referred to by the court were MO. REV. STAT. §5 451.250, .290; 507.010 (1949).
See generally note 39 supra.
55. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.040 (1949). The court stated, "If this section does
not create, it at leat recognizes the liability of a married woman for her torts; it
also absolves the husband of responsibility for the wife's torts based on the mar-
riage relation alone." 327 S.W.2d at 811 (citation omitted).
56. A lengthy and vigorous dissent argued that the court had already found
neither a statutory construction nor a public policy basis for preventing interspousal
tort lawsuits. The dissent emphasized that Missouri had consistently construed the
Married Women's Act as abrogating interspousal immunity by authorizing spouses
to sue one another in equity and at law for contractual breach and property tort.
1982]
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still the law in Missouri despite Hamilton and Ennis, which involved special
circumstances.5 7 The court added that the Married Women's Act had been
construed on several occasions to preclude personal tort actions and that it
was not in a better position to interpret the legislative intent of these statutes
than the Rogers court. 58 Finally, the court noted that the Missouri legislature
had been very active in the area of marital relations, but had not changed
the Rogers construction of the Married Women's Act.5 9
More than a decade later, the Missouri Supreme Court, against the con-
fusing backdrop of the Hamilton, Ennis, and Brawner cases, attempted to for-
malize the Missouri case law on interspousal tort immunity. 60 In Ebel v.
Ferguson,61 an ex-wife filed suit seeking damages from her ex-husband as a
result of his negligent operation of a car in which she was a passenger. The
plaintiff argued that Ennis should control the court's disposition of the case
because her marriage was as effectively terminated by divorce as the mar-
riage in Ennis was terminated by death. 62 In a plurality opinion, the court
held that the wife could not recover from her former husband and overrul-
ed Ennis on the ground that it had mistakenly characterized tort immunity
between spouses as procedural instead of substantive.
63
327 S.W.2d at 817 (Hollingsworth, C.J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissenter
noted that Ennis recognized that MO. REV. STAT. § 451.290 (1949) did not preclude
one spouse from suing the other in tort, while Hamilton purported to dispose of the
public policy barrier to suit. Id. at 820 (Hollingsworth, C.J., dissenting).
57. 327 S.W.2d at 811.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 812. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that due process
prevents the state from imposing any restriction based on marital status on litiga-
tion between spouses. The court stated that matrimonial status was a matter of
public concern and that a state in the reasonable exercise of its police power may
regulate the effect of marriage on the property rights of the parties. Id. at 815. The
court also rejected the plaintiff's equal protection argument stating, "Many
statutory and common-law obligations and privileges not equally distributed be-
tween husband and wife, such as the obligation of family support imposed on the
husband, are undoubtably valid." Id. Curiously, while the plaintiffs equal pro-
tection argument was couched in terms of an unconstitutional distinction drawn
between married and unmarried individuals, the court addressed the plaintiffs con-
tention in terms of a distinction drawn between husbands and wives.
60. In Deatherage v. Deatherage, 328 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1959), decided two
months after Brawner, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a wife could not sue
her husband for personal injuries sustained as a result of her husband's negligent
operation of a car in which she was a passenger. The court relied exclusively on
Brawner, stating that the only distinction between the cases was that the wife sought
to sue the husband in Deatherage. Id. at 625.
61. 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (plurality opinion).
62. Id. at 335 (plurality opinion).
63. Id. at 336 (plurality opinion). A strong dissent argued that it was a serious
step backwards to retreat to the unity concept to decide the issues when the con-
cept had been rejected as a sound basis for the determination of such issues on several
[Vol. 47
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The Ebel court began its analysis of the case by noting that the common
law of England had been adopted by statute in Missouri.6 4 The court then
recited two principles of the common law unity doctrine: no act committed
by one spouse against the other during marriage could be a tort, and neither
spouse could sue the other during marriage or continue, during marriage,
proceedings started before. 65 The plurality asserted that prior cases in
Missouri were misleading for failing to recognize that at common law, as
a result of the unity fiction, no cause of action came into existence when a
spouse committed a wrongful act against the other.6 6 The court said it was
extremely reluctant to create a cause of action not recognized at common
law and emphasized that the Missouri legislature was the proper body to
change the law. 67 The court concluded that Rogers, Willott,.and Brawner were
all correct in denying recovery to the plaintiff because the wrongful acts were
committed during marriage and, thus, no cause of action came into
existence.6 8 Hamilton was also correct in permitting recovery: because the
wrongful act was committed prior to marriage, a substantive cause of ac-
tion existed prior to marriage, and a statute, Missouri Revised Statutes sec-
tion 451.250,69 furnished procedural authority to maintain the action. Final-
ly, the court overruled Ennis because it permitted recovery where the
wrongful act was committed during marriage. 70
Since Ebel, the Missouri courts of appeal have been asked to abrogate
the doctrine on several occasions. In light of the Missouri Constitution pro-
vision that the decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court shall be control-
ling in all other Missouri courts,7 1 it is not surprising that the interspousal
occasions. Id. at 338 (Bardgett, J., dissenting). The dissenter further argued that
the Missouri Married Women's Act was in derogation of the common law and
should be recognized as such and that if the Missouri legislature had intended to
except tort actions from the general provisions of the Married Women's Act, it could
have done so. Id. (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
64. 478 S.W.2d at 335 (plurality opinion).
65. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in
the Law of Husband and Wife, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133, 140 (1952)). Not surprisingly,
the Ebel plurality did not mention the name of Professor Kahn-Freund's article.
Ironically, Kahn-Freund, a Law Professor at the University of London, concluded
in his article that, "It is time that ... the whole question of the mutual liability
between the spouses should be re-examined.... If and when this is done, the ar-
chaic and artificial remnants of the legal 'unity' rule should be removed .... " Id.
at 154. Not surprisingly, the Ebel plurality did not mention Kahn-Freund's con-
clusion either.
66. 478 S.W.2d at 336 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. (plurality opinion).
68. Id. (plur-lity opinion).
69. (1969).
70. 478 S.W.2d at 336 (plurality opinion).
71. MO. CONST. art. V, § 2.
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tort immunity doctrine has been uniformly upheld in the courts of appeal. 72
The courts, however, have voiced their dissatisfaction with the rule. In Ren-
frow v. Gojohn, 73 the interspousal tort immunity doctrine was held to bar a
counterclaim for contribution against a husband who was a co-plaintiff with
his wife. The court characterized interspousal immunity as a "dying doc-
trine," noting that the doctrine had been abolished or partially abrogated
in a majority of states, but said it nevertheless was bound by Ebel. 74 In Klein
v. Abramson,75 where the doctrine was held to preclude a daughter's wrongful
death suit against her stepfather for the death of her mother, the court was
even more vociferous, remarking that interspousal immunity "has sorely
vexed both bench and bar since Rogers. '" 76 The court stated, "We have no
doubt that this doctrine of interspousal immunity will receive further judicial
and legislative attention in the future. For the purposes of this case, however,
the... [past Missouri Supreme Court] decisions are absolutely binding on
us . . . . 77
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR INFLUENCES ON THE
MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
Although it has been a decade since the Ebel plurality attempted to con-
solidate the inconsistent case law by retreating to the strict confines of the
unity fiction, this area of the law in Missouri remains unstable. The factors
that have been case-dispositive to the Missouri Supreme Court have varied.
That judicial doubt exists is indicated by the court's departures from the
doctrine in Mullally, Hamilton, and Ennis and by the strong and well-reasoned
dissents in Brawner and Ebel.78 In the most recent cases, the Missouri courts
of appeal have urged that the doctrine be given further judicial and legislative
attention in the future. 79
Not only is there dissatisfaction within the state with the current status
of the law, there are also external factors adding to the pressure to change
the law. The Missouri Supreme Court often has examined the status of the
interspousal tort immunity doctrine in other jurisdictions to justify a par-
72. See, e.g., Martinez v. Lankster, 595 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Mo. App., E.D.
1980); Wyatt v. Bernhoester, 585 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
73. 600 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980). Three months earlier in Mar-
tinez v. Lankster, 595 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980), the eastern district court
of appeals held that the doctrine barred the joinder of the plaintiffs husband as a
third party defendant for indemnity.
74. 600 S.W.2d at 78-79.
75. 513 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974).
76. Id. at 717.
77. Id. at 717-18.
78. See generally Klein v. Abramson, 513 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Mo. App., K.C.
1974) (court outlined inconsistencies in Missouri interspousal tort immunity case
law).
79. See notes 73-77 and accompanying text supra.
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ticular holding.80 The national trend today is overwhelmingly toward judicial
abrogation of interspousal immunity. 81 Given the internal and external
pressures on the Missouri Supreme Court to re-examine and change the law,
it would appear to be only a matter of time before the viability of the in-
terspousal tort immunity doctrine will be contested again before the court.
Four factors have most influenced the court: adherence to the unity fiction,
reluctance to depart from the common law, presumed legislative intent, and
the doctrine of stare decisis.
A. Unity of Husband and Wife
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the Missouri case law on interspousal
tort immunity is the persistent adherence to the common law unity fiction
in the area of personal torts, a concept based on antediluvian assumptions.
82
The unity fiction at common law did not refer to the loving oneness achiev-
ed in the marriage of two free individuals. 83 Rather, this traditional premise
referred to the wife's vassalage rendered by common law coverture.
8 4
Blackstone, describing the merger of the identities at common law, wrote
that the wife's legal existence was consolidated into that of the husband
"under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; ... it
is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her hus-
band, her baron or lord."
'8 5
The jurisdictions that have abrogated interspousal tort immunity have
maintained that the unity concept is not compatible with current societal
conditions.8 6 To argue today that the unity of the marital relationship ex-
80. See, e.g., Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 813 (Mo. En Banc 1959);
Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 869, 900, 62 S.W.2d 1084, 1086 (1933); Rogers v.
Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 208, 177 S.W. 382, 384 (1915). In Ennis v. Truhitte, 306
S.W.2d 549, 550 (Mo. En Banc 1957), where the wife was allowed to sue her hus-
band's administrator, the court noted there was a trend against applying in-
terspousal tort immunity. See also Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Mo.
En Banc 1972) (plurality opinion).
81. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
82. See generally Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 621, 351 N.E.2d 526, 528
(1976).
83. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 186, 500 P.2d 771, 773 (1972).
84. Id. See also Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Mo. 1956).
85. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
86. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629,351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976)
("the reasons offered in support of the common law immunity doctrine... whatever
their vitality in the social context of generations past ... [are] inadequate today
to support a general rule of interspousal tort immunity."); Rupert v. Stienne, 90
Nev. 397, 401, 528 P.2d 1013, 4015 (1974) ("this artificial concept cannot be
seriously defended today and is not compatible with our current conditions"); Im-
mer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970) ("this metaphysical con-
cept cannot be seriously defended today"); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 311, 433
A.2d 859, 864-65 (1981) ("[M]odern conditions demand that courts no longer
engage in the automatic and unsupported assumption that one's pecuniary or pro-
prietary interest is identical to that of one's spouse.").
19821
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tends so far as to allow the husband to legally control his wife's actions ig-
nores the current consensual nature of marriage. 87 While there may have
been a time when a wife was so dependent on her husband's advice and pro-
tection in guarding her rights and interests that the couple was a single legal
entity merged in the husband, most jurisdictions recognize today that both
modern realities and the Married Women's Acts do not comport with the
traditional unity notion.88
Several states have held that the legal identity of the spouses has been
abrogated by the Married Women's Acts. 89 Several states retaining in-
terspousal tort immunity have recognized that with the passage of time and
with the passage of the Married Women's Acts, the unity doctrine has eroded
to the point where it is no longer a valid premise on which to base spousal
immunity. 90
There is judicial precedent for modification of the unity concept in
Missouri as well. In Hamilton, where the court construed section 451.250
to permit a wife to sue her husband for an antenuptial tort,91 the court, using
by far the most forceful language seen in the Missouri interspousal immunity
case law, stated, "Irrespective of statutes, any common-law rule based upon
the fiction of the identity of husband and wife, long since contrary to the
fact, should not be applied to any 'first impression' fact situation arising in
this state.'"92 The same argument was made in the dissenting opinion in Ebel.
The dissenting judge argued that on several occasions the unity concept had
been rejected as a basis for determination of interspousal immunity issues. 93
87. See, e.g., State v. Funk, 490 S.W.2d 354, 363 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973)
("The day when a husband could be regarded as the unquestioned 'head of the
house' has become part of a past which is no doubt nostalgic to some, but which
is nonetheless gone."). Recent marital dissolution cases in Missouri have
characterized the husband-wife relationship as a partnership. See In re Marriage of
Cornell, 550 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977); Corder v. Corder, 546
S.W.2d 798, 804 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
88. See note 15 supra.
89. See, e.g., Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1931); Cramer v.
Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d
15 (1957); Selfv. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962); Rains
v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A.
889 (1914); Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971); Imigv. March,
203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118
S.E. 9 (1923); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Scot-
vold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt.
98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va.
1978).
90. Seecases cited note 18 supra. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at862-63.
91. See notes 37-46 and accompanying text supra.
92. Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Mo. 1956).
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The dissenter noted that even in Brawner, where the husband's claim to sue
his wife was denied, the court's holding was not based on the unity fiction
but rather on what the court referred to as the public policy indicated by
the legislature's failure to address the issue specifically and the public policy
of stare decisis. 94 The concurring opinion in Ebel argued that the relief sought
should be denied as a matter of public policy. The concurring judge stated
that there was no "necessity or advantage to litigants or the courts which
resolve their conflicts, in returning to the rigidity of the concept of 'unity
of the spouses'." 95 Ironically, even though a majority of the judges in Ebel
argued that the unity fiction should not be used as a basis of interspousal
tort immunity, 96 this is precisely the current status of the law in Missouri.9 7
There is also a statutory basis for abrogating the unity doctrine in
Missouri. The Missouri Married Women's Act and its derivative sections
derogate from the unity fiction by authorizing married women to transact
business, convey property, contract, sue, and be sued in the same manner
as a single woman.98 The statutes also relieve the husband of liability for
his wife's torts. 99 As a result, the spouses may contract with one another and
sue each other for contractual breach. They may own property separately,
convey property to one another, and sue each other to protect their proper-
ty rights.100 Subsequent legislation has further eroded the unity concept. For
example, spouses now may sue and be sued for divorce merely on the grounds
of irreconcilable differences. 101
The unity fiction in Missouri currently is limited to personal tort actions
between the spouses. Perhaps the court's unwillingness to abrogate the unity
fiction for personal torts is based on the court's recognition of the intimate
sharing of contact and mutual concessions within the marital relationship
whereby conduct that might be tortious between two strangers is not tor-
tious between spouses. 0 2 Denial of tort liability on these grounds does not
94. Id. at 337 (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 339 (Morgan, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 338 (Bardgett,J., dissenting); id. at 339 (Morgan,J., concurring).
97. Ten years later, it is difficult to justify the Ebel holding solely on a recita-
tion of the unity doctrine. The Ebel plurality cited cases from six other states that
based interspousal tort immunity on the unity fiction. Five of the six have since
abrogated interspousal immunity. Seegenerally 478 S.W.2d at 337 (plurality opinion);
note 15 supra.
98. See notes 23, 29 & 39 supra. The derivative sections of the Missouri Mar-
ried Women's Act are currently found at MO. REv. STAT. §§ 451.250, .290;
507.010 (1978).
99. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.040 (1978) (married woman liable for her own
torts).
100. Id. § 442.025.
101. Id. 452.305(l).
102. See Brown v. Brown, -Mass . ... 409 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1980);
Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 630, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976); Beaudette v.
Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372-73, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969); Courtney v. Court-
1982] 533
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rest, however, on the unity fiction or interspousal tort immunity, but rather
on the broader application of consent to physical contact within the marital
relationship.°10 The court's persistence in adhering to the identity doctrine,
and more generally to the interspousal tort immunity doctrine, is more likely
a manifestation of the court's hesitancy to derogate from the common law,
judicial precedent, and presumed legislative intent.
B. Derogation of the Common Law
Missouri Revised Statutes section 1.010104 adopts the common law of
England prior to 1607 as the law of Missouri, except where changed by
statute. In Missouri, the common law is not abrogated by a statute that does
not expressly repeal the common law, unless the statute is in exclusive or
negative terms or is so clearly repugnant to the common law that it necessarily
implies its revocation.10 5 Statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed and do not operate as a repeal of the common law beyond their
terms, unless they are clearly repugnant to it. 106 The law does not favor repeal
of the common law by implication in a statute, and a legislative intent to
do so is generally not presumed.1
0 7
The Missouri Supreme Court's construction of the Missouri Married
Women's Act has been narrow. In Rogers, the court did not give the Mar-
ried Women's Act its facial interpretation because it "was of purely statutory
origin and in derogation of the common law."10 8 Since the statute did not
expressly provide the wife with a cause of action for personal tort against
her husband, Rogers held that the Married Women's Act had not abrogated
ney, 184 Okla. 395, 403-04, 87 P.2d 660, 669 (1938); Digby v. Digby, __ R.I.
P -) 388 A.2d 1, 4 (1978).
103. See Brown v. Brown, __ Mass.-,-, 409 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1980)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F, comment h (1977)). Comment
h provides in part:
The concept of consent to an intentional physical contact carries a much
broader scope of application within the marital relationship than it does
for other parties. Abrogation of the general immunity does not limit in any
respect the- defense of consent.
The intimacy of the family relationship may also involve some relaxa-
tion in the application of the concept of reasonable care, particularly in
the confines of the home.... An analogy to the principle of assumption
of risk is sometimes drawn.
104. (1978).
105. Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 831, 136 S.W.2d 278, 279 (1940); State
v. Dalton, 134 Mo. App. 517, 525-26, 114 S.W. 1132, 1135 (St. L. 1908).
106. Raperv. Lusk, 192 Mo. App. 378, 381, 181 S.W. 1032, 1033 (Spr. 1916);
State v. Dalton, 134 Mo. App. 517, 525-26, 114 S.W. 1132, 1135 (St. L. 1908).
107. State v. Kollenborn, 304 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Mo. 1957); State v. Dalton,
134 Mo. App. 517, 526, 114 S.W. 1132, 1135 (St. L. 1908).
108. Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 206, 177 S.W. 382, 384 (1915).
534 [Vol. 47
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/5
INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY
interspousal immunity for personal torts.10 9 The plurality in Ebel express-
ed the same hesitancy to judicially derogate from the common law stating,
"We are extremely reluctant to create a cause of action not recognized at
common law .... [Section] 1.010, by adopting the common law, implants
in Missouri the common law concept that a wrongful act between spouses
does not give rise to a cause of action."' 1 0
The jurisdictions that have abrogated or modified interspousal tort im-
munity have uniformly held that a statute adopting the English common
law does not require a court to follow the doctrine of interspousal immunity
where it is not applicable to current local conditions."1 The argument is that
a state supreme court cannot close its eyes to the legal and social needs of
society, and it should not hesitate to alter, amend, or abrogate the common
law when society's needs so dictate. 112 Missouri also has recognized that the
common law is "continually expanding with the progress of society, adapting
to the gradual changes ... of the country. '"" 3
Some states that have abrogated interspousal immunity have done so
on the basis of a statute allowing married women to sue and be sued.114 There
is judicial precedent in Missouri for derogating from the common law based
on the Married Women's Act. In Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc. , the
Missouri Supreme Court held that a wife could maintain an action for loss
of consortium, even though the wife had no such cause of action at com-
mon law. The court rejected the argument that because the Married
Women's Act did not create or confer on the wife any new rights, but only
removed former disabilities, the wife did not accede to a right of action by
reason of the act." 6 The court asserted that the wife could sue for loss of
109. Id. See also Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 898, 62 S.W.2d 1084, 1085
(1933).
110. Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (plurality
opinion). In Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. En Banc 1959), the
Missouri Supreme Court refused to give Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.040 (1949) its facial
interpretation on the basis of stare decisis and presumed legislative intent to the
contrary.
111. SeeLewisv. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531-32 (1976);
Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 399, 528 P.2d 1013, 1014 (1974); Flores v. Flores,
84 N.M. 601, 603, 506 P.2d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 1973).
112. See Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 23, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972).
113. La Plant v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231, 245 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1961). SeealsoYergerv. Smith, 338 Mo. 140, 154, 89 S.W.2d 66, 74
(1935).
114. See cases cited note 89 supra.
115. 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
116. Id. at 542. The court relied on its earlier decision in Clow v. Chapman,
125 Mo. 101, 28 S.W. 328 (1894), wherein the court allowed a wife to sue for aliena-
tion of her husband's affections, based on the Missouri Married Women's Act.
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consortium because of the comprehensive scope and purpose of the Mar-
ried Women's Act." 7
The dissenting judge in Brawner also argued that the language of Missouri
Revised Statutes section 451.290,118 which allowed a married woman to sue
and be sued, was too broad to interpret it as authorizing a married woman
to sue her husband and be sued by him for breach of a contract and for a
property tort, but not for a personal tort." 9 The same argument was made
in the Ebel dissent: "Nowhere in our statute.., does there appear any pro-
visions that maintain in existence intra-spousal immunity from suit in tort.
... Had the Missouri legislature intended to except tort actions from the
otherwise general provisions of... [the statute], it could have done so."120
The dissenter pointed to the concluding language of section 1.010, which,
in adopting the English common law, states.that "all acts of the general
assembly... shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent
and meaning thereof," and argued that the Missouri Married Women's Act
was in derogation of the common law and should be recognized as such.12'
Since Ebel was decided, the Missouri Supreme Court has abrogated the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in Jones v. State Highway Commission.122 With
regard to what effect the common law would have on the court's ability to
abrogate the doctrine, the court said:
We are led to the conclusion that our § 1.010, RSMo 1969, which
adopted the common law of England prior to 1607, the fourth year
of the reign of'James I, did not adopt the English common law as a substan-
tive statute, but rather as decisional law. Therefore, assuming arguendo
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity appeared in English
jurisprudence prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I, we
nevertheless have the authority to alter or abrogate the doctrine. 123
117. 365 S.W.2d at 542. The issue before the court in Novak is distinguishable
from the interspousal immunity issue in that a husband did have a cause of action
at common law for loss of consortium, but had no cause of action for personal tort
against his wife because of the unity fiction. Nevertheless, Novak is precedent for
the argument that the Missouri Married Women's Act is so broad as to derogate
the unity fiction and create causes of action not found at common law.
118. (1949).
119. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 821 (Mo. En Banc 1959) (Holl-
ingsworth, C.J., dissenting).
120. Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (Bardgett,
J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Bardgett,J., dissenting) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (1969)).
122. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
123. Id. at 228 (emphasis added). In 1978 Mo. Laws 983, § 1, the Missouri
legislature re-established by statute sovereign or governmental tort immunity "as
existed at common law in this state prior to Sept. 12, 1977" (the date of theJones
decision). MO. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (1978). AlthoughJones is no longer good law
due to the subsequent legislative enactment, the court's ruling that Mo. REV.
536 [Vol. 47"
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/5
INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY
There are several rationales for the Missouri Supreme Court to alter
or amend the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. The court
could do so on the basis that this common law rule does not comport with
cuirent societal conditions or by interpreting the Missouri Married Women's
Act on its face as having derogated from the common law rule. Finally, the
court arguably could use the Jones rationale to hold that interspousal tort
immunity is decisional law and, therefore, can be judicially abrogated. 124
C. Presumed Legislative Intent
The Missouri Supreme Court in upholding interspousal tort immunity
has consistently deferred to the legislature's lawmaking power and what the
court presumed to be legislative intent. For example, in Rogers, the court
noted that Missouri Revised Statutes chapter 21, section 1735,125 of the Mar-
ried Women's Act appeared in the "General Civil Code" chapter and con-
cluded that "it may be regarded more as a statute of procedure than other-
wise, in so far as the purpose of the Legislature may be determined from
the arrangement or the setting of the act." 126 In Willott, the court justified
its holding by remarking that during the eighteen years since Rogers, suc-
STAT. § 1.010 (1969) adopted decisional law would still appear to be applicable to
interspousal tort immunity as well.
It is possible that the Missouri Supreme Court, in light of the legislature's im-
mediate statutory reversal ofJones, is wary of the same result if it abrogates inter-
spousal tort immunity. The Ebd dissent noted that this happened.in Illinois. In
Brandt v. Keller, 413 11. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1953), the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the Illinois Married Women's Act did not exclude tort actions between
spouses from its general provisions. Within six months of the decision, the Illinois
legislature amended the act to provide that neither spouse could sue the other for
a personal tort committed during coverture. Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334,
339 (Bardgett, J., dissenting). See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1001 (Smith-Hurd
1980). The dissent argued that because Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.290 (1969) did not
except from its provisions tort actions between spouses, it should be given its facial
interpretation, and if the Missouri general assembly desired to amend the present
law so to except from its provisions actions in tort between spouses, it could do so
by legislative enactment, as the Illinois legislature had done. 478 S.W.2d at 339
(Bardgett, J., dissenting).
124. It is also arguable that interspousal immunity in Missouri is ajudicial doc-
trine in the first place. See notes 131-34 and accompanying text infra.
125. (1909). See note 23 supra.
126. Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 206, 177 S.W. 382, 383 (1915). Regard-
ing its determination of legislative purpose based on the placement of the statute,
the court added, "[W]e admit ... [this] is not always a safe interpretation of a stat-
ute .... "Id. The court's admission that its interpretation of the statute may not
be a safe interpretation makes the reliance in subsequent cases on the Rogers con-
struction all the more puzzling. The court in Rogers did not mention that express
language to the effect that a wife could sue her husband had been deleted from MO.
REV. STAT. ch. 21, § 1735 (1909) by the General Assembly in 1868. Seenote 23 supra.
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cessive Missouri general assemblies had not enacted contrary legislation. 27
In Brawner, after admitting that persuasive arguments could be made against
retaining interspousal immunity, the majority declined to abrogate the doc-
trine, arguing inter alia, that if the public interest demanded such change,
it should be made by the general assembly. 28 Finally, the plurality in Ebel
deferred to the general assembly's authority to create a cause of action. 129
Given the court's subsequent holding in Jones v. State Highway
Commission130 that Missouri Revised Statutes section 1.010131 adopts the com-
mon law of England as decisional law, exclusive reliance on the legislature
to initiate any change is unnecessary. Furthermore, it is arguable that in-
terspousal tort immunity in Missouri is ajudicial doctrine. 32 While it is true
that the legislature has been active in the field of marital relations, the roots
of Missouri's adherence to the doctrine lie in the initial narrow construc-
tions of the Married Women's Acts in Rogers and Willot, not in the
legislature's failure to legislate otherwise. The Missouri Supreme Court has
recognized that the terminology of the Married Women's Act is broad
enough to include personal tort suits. 133 Thus, the legislature's silence since
Rogers and Willott may not reflect legislative intent that the Married Women's
Act be so narrowly construed, but rather that the legislature prefers the court
to resolve the issue. The same argument has been made in several of the
abrogating states to circumvent a state legislature's silence following a judicial
declaration upholding interspousal tort immunity. 34 What the Missouri
Supreme Court said in Abernathy v. Sisters of St. May 's,135 in which charitable
immunity was abolished, may be applicable here:
127. Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 899, 62 S.W.2d 1084, 1085-86 (1933).
128. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
129. Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (plurality
opinion).
130. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc 1977). See notes 122 & 123 and accom-
panying text supra.
131. (1969). Currently found at MO. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (1978).
132. See Klein v. Abramson, 513 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974)
(court referred to doctrine of interspousal tort immunity in Missouri as judicial
doctrine).
133. Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Mo. En Banc 1957) (overruled
in Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (plurality opinion));
Hamilton v, Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1956). See also Ebel v. Ferguson,
478 S.W.2d 334, 339 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (Bardgett, J., dissenting); Brawner v.
Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 821 (Mo. En Banc 1959) (Hollingsworth, C.J., dissent-
ing).
134. See, e.g., Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 22-23, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797-98
(1972); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 628-29, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531 (1976);
Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 370-71, 173 N.W.2d 416, 418-19 (1969);
Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 399, 528 P.2d 1013, 1014 (1974); Flores v. Flores,
84 N.M. 601, 603-04, 506 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Ct. App. 1973); Digby v. Digby,
R.I. -, -, 388 A.2d 1, 2-3 (1978).
135. 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
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It is neither realistic nor consistent with the common law tradition
to wait upon the legislature to correct an outmoded rule of case law.
Nor is legislative silence ... [so] instructive or persuasive .... Who
can say with absolute certitude that the General Assembly's failure
to abolish the doctrine was not the result of a legislative position that,
since the doctrine is courtmade law, it is the court's function and
responsibility to change it when change is required?1 6
D. Doctrine of Stare Decisis
The doctrine of stare decisis generally is a policy of the courts to stand
by precedent. 137 The doctrine assumes that security and certainty require
that accepted and established legal principles, under which rights may ac-
crue, be recognized and followed.13 8 The doctrine is a salutary one and is
not ordinarily departed from if a decision is long-standing and rights have
been acquired under it. 39
The influence of the doctrine of stare decisis on the judicial history of
interspousal tort immunity in Missouri is evident. The best example is
Brawner, where the court found the authority in Missouri Revised Statutes
section 537.040140 for a husband to sue his wife for a personal tort commit-
ted during coverture, yet denied the husband's claim on the grounds that
the common law rule of interspousal immunity, as espoused by the court
in Rogers and Willott, was still the law in Missouri.' 4 1 The court admitted
that if it were construing similar statutes in a modern day setting, it might
well reach a different conclusion than Rogers, but stated, "[W]e are not at
liberty to say that these prior decisions do not correctly interpret the legislative
intent of 1889."142
Whether prior cases correctly interpret the legislative intent of 1889 is
irrelevant if the application of the law does not comport with the needs of
the time. The recognized exception to the application of stare decisis is where
considerations of public policy demand change. 43 The states that have
abrogated the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity make the common sense
argument that the doctrine of stare decisis must not be so narrowly pursued
136. Id. at 605.
137. Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09, 4 N.E.2d 388, 390-91 (1936); Globe
Indem. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 133 S.W.2d 1066, 1069 (Mo. App., St. L. 1940).
138. Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von Bank, 72 N.D. 497, 513, 8 N.W.2d 599,
607 (1943).
139. Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan, 344 Pa. 556, 561, 25 A.2d 728, 729
(1942).
140. (1949).
141. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Mo. En Banc 1959). See notes
51-59 and accompanying text supra.
142. 327 S.W.2d at 811.
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that the body of the common law is forever encased in a straitjacket. 144 The
nature of the common law requires that each time a rule of law is applied,
it be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the conditions and needs of the times
have not changed so as to make further application of the rule an instru-
ment of injustice. 145
In the context of interspousal tort immunity, a court must weigh the
policies underlying stare decisis against the desirability of ajudicial, rather
than a legislative, declaration that public policy is not served by interspousal
tort immunity. 146 The Missouri Supreme Court has not done so when basing
its decisions on stare decisis. In Brawner, the court deferred to the legislature's
expertise to determine whether public policy demonstrated the need for
abrogation of interspousal immunity. 147 Later in Ebel, the plurality recited
the holdings in Rogers and Willott with no discussion of whether the policies
behind stare decisis outweighed other policy considerations. 148 The doctrine
of stare decisis is justifiable, but it cannot be so strictly pursued that reality
is disregarded. 149 If, as the Ebel case indicates, interspousal tort immunity
is currently based in Missouri on the unity fiction as expressed in Rogers and
Willott, it is possible that the court is perpetuating precedent to the extent
that it belies reality.1 50
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Once the common law underpinnings and the legislative and precedential
barriers are removed, interspousal tort immunity can only be based on the
compelling dictates of public policy. One of the most striking characteristics
of the Missouri interspousal immunity case law is the lack of policy discussion.
The two basic policy arguments for maintaining interspousal tort im-
munity are that immunity promotes marital harmony and prevents collusive
claims. 51 The former argument was enunciated in Rogers, where the court
implied that the Missouri Married Women's Act should not be construed
144. See, e.g., Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 22, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972);
Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539, 546 (Mo. En Banc 1963);
Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 400, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1974).
145. Authorities cited note 144 supra. See also Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 316,
433 A.2d 859, 867 (1981).
146. Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Mo. 1955).
147. Brawnerv. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 811-13 (Mo. En Banc 1959). The
court stated that the general assembly was better equipped and had greater authority
to deal with the particular problem and, at the same time, the related ones. Id. at
813. The court said the related problems included privileged communications of
married persons, a husband's liability for his wife's support, children's rights of
inheritance, and insurance regulation. Id.
148. Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (plurality
opinion).
149. Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 22, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972).
150. See Part III.A. supra.
151. See generally Moore, supra note 6.
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so as to cause domestic strife. 152 The reasoning behind this argument is that
if one spouse intentionally or negligently injures the other, a lawsuit based
on the wrongful act only serves to aggravate any ill feelings the spouses may
already have for one another.1 5 3 The policy argument for preventing col-
lusive claims is based on the reasoning that it is unrealistic to expect the
defendant-spouse to do everything within his power to defeat the claim of
the plaintiff-spouse.15 The problem is magnified when the defendant-spouse
is insured and the couple will collect a windfall.15 5
The courts that have abrogated or modified interspousal immunity have
uniformly rejected both of these policy arguments. The most common argu-
ment is that conjugal harmony is no more threatened by personal tort ac-
tions than by property, contract, or other actions that are permitted between
spouses. 156 Some courts have argued that if a state of peace exists between
the spouses, either no action will be commenced or the spouses will allow
the action to continue only as long as their personal harmony is not
jeopardized. 5 7 Other courts have noted that in the case of intentional torts,
it is doubtful that there is any marital harmony left to disturb. 5 8
152. Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 207, 177 S.W. 382,384(1915). The court
stated,
Whether the absence of the husband's authority to sue his wife for a per-
sonal tort is due to the doctrine of the unity created by the marriage rela-
tion, or to an effort on the part of the legislatures and courts to promote
harmony or at least lessen the cause of controversy between husband and
wife, the nonexistence of the husband's right in this regard uniformly
prevails. If nonexistent in the husband, there are stronger reasons, in the
absence of an express statute, why it should be held not to be possessed
by the wife.
Id.
153. Id. See also Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1950); Lyons v.
Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 244, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1965).
154. Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979); Robeson v. Interna-
tional Indem. Co., 248 Ga. 306, -, 282 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1981); Varholla v.
Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 270, 383 N.E.2d 888, 889-90 (1978).
155. See, e.g., Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979). Some courts
have noted the reciprocal and often antagonistic relationship between the policies
of promotion of marital harmony and avoidance of collusive claims. A true adver-
sary proceeding between the husband and wife would have an upsetting and em-
bittering effect on domestic tranquility. On the other hand, if the lawsuit is not
adversary and there is no real conflict of interest between spouses, domestic tran-
quility is not threatened, but there is a great probability of fraudulent or collusive
claims, especially if the defendant spouse is insured. See Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.
2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979); Robeson v. International Indem. Co., 248 Ga. 306, .,
282 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1981).
156. Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 20-21, 284 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1972); Imig
v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 541, 279 N.W.2d 382, 384-85 (1979); Rupert v. Stienne,
90 Nev. 397, 402, 528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1974); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 603,
506 P.2d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 1973).
157. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972).
158. Windauerv. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 268, 485 P.2d 1157, 1158 (1971);
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The courts in abrogating jurisdictions have also discounted the danger
of collusive claims. They argue that the adversary system is sophisticated
enough to ferret out the nonmeritorius claims and dismiss those parties who
would practice fraud on the courts.1 59 To deny one spouse the opportunity
to recover for the tortious conduct of the other belies the centuries-old trust
in the jury system.160 An interspousal tort claim should not be saddled with
the presumption of fraud ab initio.1
6 1
The Hamilton court addressed these two policy arguments with respect
to permitting antenuptial tort actions. The arguments made by the Hamilton
court are identical to those propounded by the courts that have abrogated
the doctrine. The Hamilton court reasoned that allowing interspousal suits
for antenuptial personal torts would not disrupt domestic tranquility more
than those actions already permitted between spouses. 162 The court pointed
out that marital harmony is disturbed as much by the desire to recover as
by the recovery itself. 163 The Hamilton court also reasoned that the danger
of fraudulent claims was no greater between spouses than between
strangers. 164 The court stated that courts and juries are as able to deal with
trivial, fraudulent, and fictitious claims between spouses as between other
litigants.165
The primary policy argument in favor of abrogating interspousal tort
immunity is compensation of tort victims. 166 The general rule is that a per-
son proximately injured by the act of another, whether willfully or
negligently, should be compensated, in the absence of a statute or compel-
ling reasoh of public policy to the contrary.167 The state of matrimony alone
Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978); Imig v. March, 203
Neb. 537, 541, 279 N.W.2d 382, 384 (1979); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 271,
287 P.2d 585, 598 (1955).
159. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102,
104 (1962); Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 21-22, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972);
Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969); Imig v.
March, 203 Neb. 537, 541-42, 279 N.W.2d 382, 385 (1979).
160. Authorities cited noted 159 supra. The same argument has been made in
response to the claim that abolishing interspousal tort immunity will lead to an
avalanche of trivial lawsuits. See Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo.
1956).
161. Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 401, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1974).
162. Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1956).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The court also stated that the cost of liability insurance should not deter-
mine the presence or absence of a legal right anymore than should the existence
of liability insurance in a given case cause liability when it does not exist. Id. See
generally Casey, The Trend of Interspousal and Parental Immunity-Cakewalk Liability,
45 INS. COUNS. J. 321 (1978).
166. See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694-95, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr.
102, 104 (1962); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 402, 528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1974);
Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972).
167. See Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 689, 376 P.2d 65, 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97,
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arguably is not sufficient justification for preventing suit on an actionable
wrong. 168
What sparse discussion there is in Missouri regarding policy reasons for
and against maintaining the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity leans
in favor of abrogating the doctrine. The policy arguments invoked by the
court in Hamilton can be applied as easily to torts committed during
coverture. 169 The disruption to domestic tranquility would appear to be no
greater in allowing a suit for an antenuptial tort. Likewise, the threat of col-
lusive or fraudulent suits seems no greater for torts committed during cover-
ture than for premarital torts.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether or not interspousal tort immunity is retained in Missouri, the
unity fiction is no longer ajustifiable basis for the doctrine.170 Courts in both
retaining and abrogating jurisdictions overwhelmingly have disapproved
of the unity fiction. 171 Even a majority of the judges in Ebel agreed that the
case should not be decided on the basis of the unity of the spouses.1 72
In the absence of an express statute, it is reasonable to argue that in-
terspousal immunity today must be based on the dictates of public policy.
The language of the pertinent Missouri statutes is not compelling enough
to bypass an examination of public policy.173 When the interspousal immuni-
ty issue comes before the Missouri Supreme Court again, it should evaluate
the policy reasons for and against retaining the doctrine and determine
whether the needs of society dictate a change in the law. The primary public
policy argument in favor of abrogating the immunity is that a remedy should
be afforded to a tort victim. This general rule that the courts of justice are
open to all persons is in the Missouri Constitution. 74 If the policy reasons
101 (1962).
168. See Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 402, 528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1974). Some
states retaining interspousal immunity have argued that there is adequate relief
available for an injured spouse in the criminal and divorce courts. See Mims v. Mims,
305 So. 2d 787, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200,
208, 177 S.W. 382, 384 (1915). In Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647
(Mo. 1956), the Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument in the case of an
antenuptial tort. The Hamilton argument is the same as that adopted by the courts
that have abrogated interspousal immunity: the criminal and divorce courts do not
purport to compensate the victim forpersonal injuries. See, e.g., Flores v. Flores,
84 N.M. 601, 603, 506 P.2d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 1973); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.
2d 183, 187-88, 500 P.2d 771, 774-75 (1972).
169. See Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 822 (Mo. En Banc 1959) (Holl-
ingsworth, CJ., dissenting).
170. See Part III.A. supra.
171. See notes 18 & 86 and accompanying text supra.
172. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 114-21 and accompanying text supra.
174. MO. CONST. artI, § 14provides, "That the courts ofjustice shall be open
to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property
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for maintaining interspousal immunity are no longer viable, then the policy
of compensating tort victims demands the abrogation of interspousal
immunity.
The policy arguments for and against retaining interspousal immunity
are logical. These arguments, however, do not seem applicable to intentional
torts. 175 For example, when one spouse intends to harm the other, there is
little or no domestic harmony to preserve by precluding the injured spouse
from suing. 176 Even the common law unity of the spouses did not bestow
on the husband the right to harm his wife as he saw fit.177 Likewise, the danger
of collusive claims in the intentional tort context seems relatively insignificant.
There are other safeguards available to effectuate the policy arguments
in favor of retaining interspousal immunity should the immunity be
abolished. For example, the broader application of consent to physical contact
in the marital relationship decreases the number of actions that would be
tortious as between spouses.178 The risks of intentional contact in marriage
are such that one spouse should not recover damages from the other without
substantial evidence that the injurious contact was plainly excessive or a gross
abuse of normal privilege. 179 The risk of negligent conduct is likewise so usual
that the trial court could instruct the jury about the injured spouse's peculiar
assumption of the risk. 180
It belies reality and fact to say that when a spouse intentionally or
negligently injures the other there is no tort or there is no harm to the in-
jured spouse. To abrogate the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is
arguably not to create a cause of action as suggested by the Ebel plurality,
but rather to cease refusing to recognize a cause of action where th6 reasons
for so refusing have themselves ceased to exist. 181
JEFFREYJ. BRINKER
or character." The Missouri Supreme Court has not addressed whether marital
immunity violates this section.
175. See Moore, supra note 6, at 943.
176. See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
177. See Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 268, 485 P.2d 1157, 1158
(1971).
178. See authorities cited note 103 supra.
179. Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969).
180. Id.
181. In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980), the Maine
Supreme Court said:
Since the early days of the common law a cause of action in tort has been
recognized to exist when the negligence of one person is the proximate cause
of damage to another person. It does not 'create a new cause of action'
to abandon 'the arcane transmutation of two human beings, once they have
become husband and wife, into a single legal personality,' and thereby
allow an already existing cause of action to be in play.
Id. at 75 (citation omitted).
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